Sasin Ph.D. candidates will have their Ph.D. Dissertation Final Defense on
April 20, 2022 at Sasin School of Management and the event is open to the public.
| Topic |
Presenter |
Time |
| Board of Directors: Board Characteristics, LGBT-Supportive Policy, and Innovation – Evidence from US Firms |
Pongsapak Chindasombatcharoen |
1:00pm – 2:30pm |
| Two Essays in Investment and Corporate Finance |
Nopparat Wongsinhirun |
2:30pm – 4:00pm |
Date: April 20, 2022
Venue: Room 521, Sasin School of Management
Due to health and safety considerations, seats are limited.
Register here to reserve your seat.
For more information please contact Nanthapak Pinyo at 091 479 4551, 02 218 4036 or
nanthapak.pinyo@sasin.edu
Board of Directors: Board Characteristics, LGBT-Supportive Policy, and Innovation – Evidence from US Firms
Pongsapak Chindasombatcharoen
Sasin Ph.D. Candidate
Essay I: Do co-opted boards strategically choose LGBT-supportive policies?
Motivated by agency theory and resource dependency theory, we explore which board characteristics affect a firm’s innovation. Using textual-based innovation measures (Bellstam, Bhagat, and Cookson, 2019) as a proxy for innovation, we find that female directors, board age, and board size adversely affect a firm’s innovation.
Essay II: Which board characteristics affect a firm’s innovation?
This study investigates whether the co-opted board, that is, the proportion of directors appointed after the current CEO takes office, influences firms’ adoption of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)-supportive policies.
Two Essays in Investment and Corporate Finance
Nopparat Wongsinhirun
Sasin Ph.D. Candidate
Essay I: Do algorithm traders mitigate insider trading profits? Evidence from the Thai stock market
This paper asks whether algorithm traders (AT) mitigate insider trading profits in the Thai stock market from the period of 2010 to 2016. We find that in general, it does, but not in the case of buy-side, big trades, or executive trades.
Essay II: Do takeover threats influence corporate social responsibility? Evidence from hostile takeover vulnerability
Theory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, we investigate the effect of the takeover market on corporate social responsibility performance.